Amid the swift and stunning collapse of Aleppo following an assault led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which is internationally sanctioned as a terrorist group, it is important to pause and recall that we have been here before.
The advance by HTS and Turkish-backed rebels in Syria suggests that Turkey is playing its cards before US president-elect Donald Trump takes office, driven by its existential fear of a Kurdish enclave in northern Syria.
Turkey had been frustrated with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s repeated refusal to come to the negotiating table and meet with Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan, although both Syrian and Turkish defense and intelligence chiefs have met regularly in Russia.
Al-Assad has been negotiating through his ministers while relying on the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Russia for the diplomatic push.
Yet, while the finger of blame has been pointed at Turkey, the Israel factor cannot be discounted.
Just days before the fall of Aleppo, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened Syria against facilitating aid to Hezbollah – and it is no coincidence that this crisis began shortly after the Lebanon ceasefire was finalized.
It was almost timed perfectly to suggest that there has been some sort of nod to the armed groups in Idlib. Some Syrian opposition groups have acknowledged that Israel’s ceasefire helped them. Turkish-backed groups went so far as to thank Israel and further said they want good relations with Tel Aviv.
A key difference
But while many observers assert that Assad is on the ropes, his main backers, Russia and Iran, are already flexing their military and diplomatic muscle – and unlike the previous time Assad was in trouble in 2012, major players in the region, including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Iraq, are publicly backing Syria’s sovereignty. Iraq said it shall help Syria militarily as well.
With the exception of Qatar, all Arab ambassadors are back in Damascus – and since the fall of Aleppo, there has been a reaffirmation of support for Syria, marking a key difference from when the conflict was viewed as a civil war.
Indeed, as Aleppo was falling, the UAE and US were on the verge of potentially removing sanctions on Syria. Assad must now finally take their advice on rapprochement with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan before the situation spirals out of control.
There has been much talk of increased tensions in the occupied Golan Heights, with Israel violating the 1973 buffer zone as it ordered some army units to move out of the demarcated UN line since 1973, almost as if they anticipated trouble to create a buffer zone like in Lebanon along the Litani river.
At the same time, there has been a quiet flurry of diplomatic activity in recent months, from the Italians to the Saudis, placing Assad center-stage for a potential new shakeup in the Levant.
A number of EU countries, led by Italy, are calling for a major rethink of ties with Syria, spurred by the need to engage Assad for their own migration and security issues. Erdogan is almost begging Assad for a meeting, and with the UAE already increasing aid to Syria to help displaced Lebanese people, Damascus is set to regain a key role in the region after the dust settles in Beirut and Gaza.
Syria has carefully maintained a low profile during Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza. Whilst being a key member of the axis of resistance for the last 40 years, Syria has not been averse to talking or doing deals with Israel. It has at numerous times almost solved the issue of Golan, so it knows the balance.
US President Donald Trump’s new Arab envoy, Massad Boulos, is a political ally of Assad’s best friend in Lebanon, Suleiman Frangieh, who is one of the key candidates for the presidency.
Those who know the history of Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) will know just how critical Syria is to the delicate balance of the region’s unorthodox relationships, which are not quite as black and white as they seem. Everything is not simply what faraway DC analysts label as “Shia versus Sunni”.
A recent report outlines how, in the lead-up to Iran’s 1979 revolution, Syria refused safe passage to Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to avoid further antagonizing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Prominent Syrian journalist Ibrahim Hamidi goes further in explaining the nuances of what Syria was trying to achieve in Lebanon and Palestine, as Syrian troops and allies sometimes clashed with Hezbollah to protect their own interests.
But the Israelis know that for any final peace with the Palestinian people, there must first be an understanding with Damascus.
Similarly, Hamas’s recent U-turn on its relationship with Syria – alongside Israeli support for Syrian armed groups against Assad, and Tel Aviv’s now-famous contention that there would have been no Syrian uprising “if Assad made peace with us” – show how intricately linked the Palestinian file is to Syria’s endgame for Israel.
To be clear, Syria is under no illusions: half the country has been reduced to rubble. But its strength has never been an all-out powerful military or strategic arms advantage. It is what author David Lesch has called Syria’s ability to punch above its weight.
It is Syria’s ability to outlast its opponents and ride out the storm, rather than beating its opponents into submission. Assad, despite Israel’s frequent strikes on Iranian targets in Damascus, has not taken any retaliatory actions that could further raise Israel’s ire.
Perhaps the most important element of Assad’s pivotal role in the current mess is Erdogan’s eagerness to meet him. Assad has so far rejected these overtures, saying it would not be an easy path to reconciliation with Turkey. Erdogan, however, has been pleading with Russia to bring Syria to the table. This rejection appears to have prompted Turkish-backed groups to reshuffle the cards in northern Aleppo.
The big “so what” from all of this is that even in Syria’s diminished capacity, after more than a decade of war, almost every month we are seeing more ambassadors and global leaders return to Damascus.
They see Assad as the best option not just for Syria, but also to help both the Syrian and Lebanese refugees -who fled Lebanon during the recent war – and to resolve the deadlock of the Lebanese presidency. More than a year ago, France acquiesced to a plan to push Assad’s best friend, Frangieh, as the best candidate for president in Lebanon, against the wishes of other European allies.
Amid the reordering of Lebanon, one thing that has stood the test of time is Syria’s ability to remain relevant, despite all the damage it has incurred. While Syria depends on Russia and Iran militarily, its global diplomatic support has increased, from Italy, to Saudi Arabia, to China – and this will eventually decide the future of Syria, and the region.
*The writer specializes in contemporary military history of the Middle East. He was a Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute from 2015 to 2019. Currently, he is a Fellow at The Institute for Statecraft and a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, and he lectures at several military staff colleges across the Middle East.
(Middle East Eye)
December 7, 2024
The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of Aequitas Review.
