Türkiye’s seemingly fractious relationship with Russia, which contains elements of both cooperation and conflict simultaneously, seems to be keeping many flabbergasted. As the human mind cannot stand contradictions, it tends to concentrate on one side of a given inconsistency in order to better make sense of things by simplifying them.
The recent reactions to Ankara’s latest engagements with Moscow attest to the limited condition of the human mind, as it were. As Erdogan and Putin pledged to deepen their cooperation, especially in trade and energy, following their bilateral meeting in Russia’s Sochi, Türkiye’s ties with Russia have been once more spotlighted and problematized, with some Western officials going as far as threatening Ankara with sanctions.
This is clearly a biased and parochial view of Türkiye’s relations with Russia, which disproportionately highlights the elements of cooperation while disregarding the ones of profound conflict in this relationship as if it exclusively consists of the former. The reality is, as usual, much more complex.
As a matter of fact, the alarmist portrayal of Türkiye’s relations with Russia is not only the result of a failure in grasping the complexity of the issue, but also the result of a strong desire to achieve a change in Ankara’s policy. Through accusations, threats, and criticisms, Türkiye is being pressured to sever its ties with Russia – just for the sake of it— and to hop on the bandwagon of sanctions against the latter without any well-defined strategic goal. As such, it is a pretty short-sighted policy or effort since turning Türkiye into any other European or NATO country would do no good to anyone, neither Europe, Ukraine, or the rest of the world.
On the contrary, it is Türkiye’s unique and balanced position between Russia and Ukraine on one hand and between Russia and the West on the other that enables the former to “get things done” and it does so not for its own benefit exclusively. From hosting the peace talks in Istanbul to bringing together the foreign ministers of Ukraine and Russia, and lastly, to securing the “Grain Deal,” none of these activities could be taken as ones that exclusively serve Turkish national interests. The Grain Deal provides the most conspicuous example of the global ramifications of Türkiye’s sustained balanced conduct, going beyond the warring parties and the immediate environment of the war in Ukraine.
Nevertheless, this is not to say that Türkiye is putting everyone else’s interests and priorities above its own. Like every rational actor, Türkiye is pursuing, first and foremost, its own interests, which also happen to benefit third parties, too, as a side benefit.
Türkiye’s national interests dictate maintaining a “balance” at multiple levels and on many issues in its foreign policy. And “balance” is everywhere in Türkiye’s manifold dealings with Russia. It is not only balancing between the West and Russia but also balancing its bilateral relations with Russia during the Ukraine conflict by employing carrots and sticks together: not joining the West’s sanctions against Russia, yet at the same time closing the Straits and Turkish airspace to Moscow’s Syria-related military activity, ripping Moscow off supplying the Syrian regime militarily.
Likewise, it is balancing between Ukraine and Russia: supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity, yet resisting to ban Russian civilian and economic mobility to Türkiye.
What’s even more important is that this “balancing” by Türkiye did not start with the conflict in Ukraine. Balance has been the essence of Türkiye’s bilateral relations with Russia for years. Whereas Türkiye and Russia have had long-term strategic relations in energy—both fossil and nuclear—trade, investments, tourism, etc., they agree on literally nothing on geopolitical issues beyond their bilateral relations.
They always find themselves on the opposing sides of conflicts that take place in areas of common interest, such as Syria, Libya, Crimea/Ukraine, South Caucasus, Central Asia, and so on. Türkiye had to stand up against Russia in all those areas of common interest, at times at the cost of direct military conflict with Moscow, to safeguard its interests, and it did so on its own. Having to deal with Russia alone taught bitter lessons to Türkiye, not only because of the Kremlin’s reckless behavior and use of crude force but also because of the sense of abandonment by its Western allies in the face of Russian brinkmanship on many occasions.
Russia is an extremely difficult actor to deal with, and Türkiye learned it the hard way. Accordingly, Türkiye has developed a coping mechanism, a peculiar way of dealing with Russia over years. It entails managing a mixture of conflict and cooperation with Russia. Cooperation, or sharing some stakes with Russia, function as “credits” to be spent later, on other fronts, either to convince Moscow to do something or to “earn” the leeway to escalate against Russia when necessary.
Türkiye is basically transposing its hard-earned and valuable experience in peacetime to its delicate balancing in wartime on multiple levels. Türkiye’s Western allies must make the most of this skill and experience instead of striving to kill it.
*The writer is a foreign policy researcher at the SETA Foundation. His research interests include Türkiye’s foreign and security policies in the MENA region, non-state armed actors, civil war, countering violent extremism, and Turkish-Russian relations.
(TRT World)
August 21. 2022
The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of Aequitas Review.
