The flood of articles and coverage accompanying Saudi celebrations of the sixth anniversary of the appointment of the crown prince provides an opportunity for observers and interested parties to get acquainted with the “new political mentality” of the Kingdom’s most powerful man, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, not only because of the never-ending stream of commentary but also because it all stems from the same source and follows the same script.
The abundance of articles churned out cannot hide the fact that they are practically identical to one another. There are two facets to this issue. The downside is the narrow limits of freedom of opinion and thought. But the upside is that we now know that the narratives presented and the priorities and approaches implicit in them reflect the views and perspectives of the de facto head-of-state, and not just their authors.
We shall set aside the expressions of flattery, aggrandizement, and glorification common on such festive occasions to present a quick assessment of what we consider to be the keys to understanding the new Saudi policy both on the internal and foreign fronts. We will focus on points repeated in most, if not all, articles and coverage of the occasion, at times using almost identical phrasing. What can we discover from this assessment?
“The great Saudi Arabia” and “total autonomy of decision” are two of the most commonly used phrases in Saudi rhetoric describing the Kingdom’s foreign policy. When it comes to domestic policies, the focus is on “internal revolution”, “building national identity”, “combating corruption”, “diversifying the economy and resources”, “beating addiction to oil”, and “green development”.
The term “the great Saudi Arabia” reflects how the Crown Prince envisions the Kingdom’s status and role in the coming decade. It explains the news and reports we have received about the Kingdom viewing itself not as an influential regional power alongside other rival and allied powers in the region, but as an international power with a say in the fate of the global economy and the energy market and a force to be reckoned with in the delicate balances of the new or emerging world order.
Recognizing this new Saudi approach allows us to explain another approach adopted by the Kingdom in its renewed quest to lead the Arab world. Riyadh operates from that principle with everything it says and does. Egypt, with its successive internal crises and the marked decline of its regional role, is in no position to compete with it, nor are Syria and Iraq capable of assuming their traditional, historic roles after years of bloodshed and wars at home and abroad. Within the GCC system, there are diligent efforts underway to contain both Qatar and the UAE after years of eluding the grasp of Saudi hegemony, making it appear that there were three drivers operating the Gulf train when there was only a Saudi driver when it left the station over forty years ago.
Among other things, this explains how Riyadh went from opposing and resisting efforts to return the Arabs to Syria and return Syria to the Arab League to spearheading the mission and striving to remove obstacles to accomplishing it.
This accounts for the presence of Iraq at the recent consultative meeting in Jeddah and the absence of Morocco, which objects to Syria’s return for several reasons, some of which are related to appeasing Washington and others to the desire to punish Syria due to its stance toward the Polisario Front and its close ties with its bitter foe, Algeria.
The fact that Riyadh is suddenly forging ties with Hamas and cautiously reopening the Palestinian reconciliation dossier shows that it does not recognize the exclusive claim of any other party or capital over managing the Palestinian dossier and believes itself the best qualified to engage with everyone at the highest levels. As it stands on the threshold of this endeavor, our sources tell us that it is also making preparations in coordination with the EU to revive the Beirut Peace Initiative, most likely as part of a Saudi campaign objecting to the “Abraham Accords” normalization track.
Riyadh appears to have come to a renewed realization that no party can lead the Arab world without paying special attention to the Palestinian cause, in all its aspects. Is it retreating from its prolonged disengagement from this dossier?
Yemen is another arena where the Kingdom clearly desires to appear as a “big brother”. Despite its tireless efforts to close this dossier and extricate itself from the quagmire of eight hard years of war, it insists on signing the agreement with Ansar Allah as a “mediator” of the conflict and not as a main party to it. Sanaa refused this, and rightly so, despite knowing that the Saudi negotiator’s position is a bid to save face, stemming from Riyadh’s desire to “rise above” disputes between “enemy brothers”, in line with its new vision for itself and its role and status in leading the Arab world.
In my opinion, this vision will continue to govern the Kingdom’s actions in a number of regional states in open crises. We have seen this manifested in Iraq, with its efforts to open up to various parties, and in Sudan, with the Saudi Foreign Minister’s rush to call the warring generals. It is not unlikely for these efforts to extend to Lebanon, as they did to Palestine, leading us to witness a different Saudi approach to handling the presidency crisis, the government dossier, the power vacuum, and the economic and financial hardships.
The second key to understanding the shifts in Saudi policy, especially foreign policy, lies in the term “total autonomy of decision”, which was mentioned verbatim in many articles. The most prominent example of this cited by Saudi presses and writers is the “bold, historic decision”, brokered by the Chinese this time around, to open up to Iran, despite facing explicit and implicit pressures and threats per Saudi commentators. This rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh has brought about new approaches toward Yemen, Syria, and perhaps Palestine as well. This is a very remarkable development that indicates that the crown prince’s decision to turn over a new leaf with Iran was not taken to antagonize Washington or as a bargaining chip nor as a tactic to pass the time until a new US administration takes office, as imagined in some political and media circles. Rather, it is a reflection of a fundamentally new direction in Saudi foreign policy.
In fact, observers of Saudi policy over the past two years will have invariably noticed an unprecedented degree of independence from the US in decision-making. This was evident in Riyadh’s adherence to OPEC+’s decisions despite the US wrath and its neutral stance on the Ukraine crisis despite US/European pressure, not to mention accelerating Saudi engagement with China in domains that transcend finance, business, and energy and extend to politics, diplomacy, security, and defense.
The bottom line is that the Kingdom is changing its approach both at home and abroad. It seeks to establish new rules for dealing with its partners, allies, and enemies alike.
However, it may be too early to tell how far Saudi Arabia will take its hard-hitting changes, how well it can tolerate and deal with the backlash to its new policies, and whether Arab states in its immediate and remote surroundings will accept for it to take the reins for the foreseeable future.
*The writer is the Director of Al Quds Center for Political Studies.
(Al Mayadeen English)
April 23, 2023
The viewpoints expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the opinions, viewpoints and editorial policies of Aequitas Review.
